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Abstract
This paper considers the use of alternative welfare metrics in evaluations of in-
come inequality in a multi-period context. Using Norwegian longitudinal income
data, it is found, as in many studies, that inequality is lower when each individ-
ual’s annual average income is used as welfare metric, compared with the use of
a single-period accounting framework. However, this result does not necessarily
hold when aversion to income fluctuations is introduced. Furthermore, when ac-
tual incomes are replaced by expected incomes (conditional on an initial period),
using a model of income dynamics, higher values of inequality over longer periods
are typically found, although comparisons depend on inequality and variability
aversion parameters. The results are strongly influenced by the observed high
degree of systematic regression towards the (geometric) mean, combined with a
large extent of individual unexpected effects.
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1 Introduction
Evaluations of changes in the distribution of income must begin by deciding on a
number of fundamental ingredients, each of which involves value judgements. First, a
choice of ‘welfare metric’, concerning what is to be measured for each unit of analysis,
must be made. Secondly, a decision is needed regarding the time period of analysis.
Thirdly, the unit of analysis itself must be chosen. Finally, the form of ‘social eval-
uation function’, which encapsulates further explicit distributional value judgements,
has to be specified. The present paper explores the use of alternative welfare metrics
in a multi-period context, using the individual as the basic unit of analysis and an ad-
ditive, individualistic Paretean social welfare function reflecting belief in the ‘principle
of transfers’ (whereby a transfer from relatively rich to poor individuals, leaving their
rankings unchanged, is considered an improvement). The welfare metrics are based on
alternative income concepts rather than, say, consumption or utility measures which
allow for variations in the value of leisure time.
Consideration of a multi-period context necessarily introduces the role of income
mobility. This implies that inequality of income measured over a longer period is lower
than that in the highest single year.1 A further argument concerns comparative static
changes: if higher annual income inequality is associated with increased relative in-
come mobility, it is possible that inequality of income measured over several years is
lower. Hence, longer-period inequality may fall, and welfare might increase, despite the
rise in annual income inequality: this is referred to as a ‘mobility offsetting’ argument.
However, the welfare metric could allow for other effects.2 For example, if there is
imperfect substitutability of incomes over time (Atkinson, Bourguignon and Morris-
son, 1992) and individuals are averse to income variability, the offsetting argument is
weakened; see Creedy and Wilhelm (2002).
The discussion is typically, as above, carried out in terms of ex-post income mea-
sures. An alternative approach, explored here, is to attempt to allow explicitly for the
uncertainty associated with mobility by constructing a welfare metric based on an ex-
ante income measure. This in turn requires the use of a model of expectations formation
based on observed income dynamics. The association between mobility and ex-ante
1Conditions under which inequality is lower than in all years are examined by Creedy (1997a).
2The question of whether income mobility represents equality of opportunity, as in Bénabou and
Ok (2001a), is not considered here.
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income uncertainty has also been stressed by Parker and Rougier (2001), Gottschalk
and Spolaore (2002)3 and Ben-Shahar and Sulganik (2008).4
This paper presents results where expected income is derived by estimating an au-
toregressive model of income dynamics. A closed-form expression for expected income,
conditional on initial income, is obtained. Thus a ‘rational expectations’ approach is
used, whereby individuals are assumed to form expectations based on the dynamic
model of incomes and associated parameter estimates. The model specifies the log-
arithm of individual income in a given period as a function of the relative distance
from the geometric mean of a previous period’s income, an individual fixed effect and
a stochastic component. The social welfare function, and hence distributional value
judgements, examined are based on the Atkinson (1970) inequality index. To illustrate
the framework, longitudinal data for individuals in Norway over the period 1993—2005
are used.
An alternative approach to measuring long-period inequality involves the use of a
‘utility-equivalent annuity’, introduced by Nordhaus (1973) and defined as the constant
value which gives the same lifetime utility as the actual time profile.5 This can clearly
allow for an aversion to variability as well as imperfect capital markets. This concept
has recently been used by Aaberge and Mogstad (2010) and Aaberge et al. (2011)
to examine equality of opportunity.6 They distinguish two cases. First, equality of
opportunity is reflected in equal outcomes for all those with the same ‘effort’, so that
emphasis is on within-group inequality of utility-equivalent annuity. Second, between-
group comparisons are made where groups are instead defined by common ‘opportunity
sets’, and within-group inequality arising from different degrees of ‘effort’ are considered
irrelevant. The authors refer to the former as an ex-post approach and the latter as an
ex-ante approach. This interesting perspective clearly differs from the ex-ante concept
examined in the present paper.
3They present a decomposition analysis where the extent to which future incomes depend on current
income is separated from effects due to rank reversals. For other decompositions, see Ruiz-Castillo
(2004), Van Kerm (2004) and Jenkins and Van Kerm (2006).
4Other studies involving mobility and long-term incomes include, for example, Shorrocks (1978a),
Chakravarty, Dutta and Weymark (1985), Fields (2010) and Hungerford (2011). For surveys of mo-
bility, see Atkinson, Bourguignon and Morrisson (1992), Maasoumi (1998) and Fields and Ok (1999).
5Comparisons using this and alternative measures, using a lifetime simulation model, are reported
in Creedy (1997b).
6They also measure mobility in terms of the reduction in this longer-period income concept, fol-
lowing Shorrocks (1978a).
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In Section 2 the data and the Atkinson index are briefly described. Section 3
presents results using ex-post welfare metrics. Section 4 introduces ex-ante income
uncertainty and presents a procedure for using expected future incomes in the welfare
metric. Section 5 summarises the main findings.
2 Data and Inequality Measurement
The data used below come from Income Statistics for Persons and Families in Norway
1993—2005 (Statistics Norway, 2006). These data contain register-based information
on the whole population, derived primarily from information retrieved from all income
tax returns in the Directorate of Taxes’ Register of Personal Tax-Payers. The choice
of time period, 1993—2005, is conditioned on the register being established in 1993,
and the desirability of avoiding the tax reform of 2006, as a reform normally involves
measurement challenges. Nevertheless, as data primarily are used to illustrate the
alternative metrics, the choice of time period mainly follows from the desire to explore
data from a sufficiently long time period to be divided into two periods of equal length.
The income measure is annual income after tax. Thus income is defined as labour
income, plus positive capital income, plus net capital gains, plus transfers minus direct
taxes. This is the definition used in all official income statistics in Norway. Negative
capital income (interest paid on mortgages) is not included in the definition because
there is no corresponding income from housing in the statistics. Estimates of income
mobility are typically sensitive to persons entering and leaving the labour market.
Hence, persons under age 26 and above 65 are excluded, and those with an income
below 100NOK7 in any year are excluded. The effects of inflation have been removed
by deflating all incomes to the 1998 level using the consumer price index.
Results are presented using the well-known Atkinson (1970) inequality measure.
Let individual i’s income (the welfare metric, ignoring time for now) be denoted yi,
for i = 1, ..., n. The Atkinson measure is based on the additive social welfare function,
W = W (y1, ..., yn) of the form W =
∑n
i=1 U (yi), where U (yi) is the weight attached
7This is equivalent to US$15.50 using 2005 exchange rate.
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to yi, and is specified, for ε = 1, as:
8
U (yi| ε) =
y1−εi
1− ε
(1)
Hence ε ≥ 0 captures the concavity of U , corresponding to the aversion to relative
inequality. Let yEDE denote the equally distributed equivalent income, that is, the
income which, if obtained by each person, gives the same social welfare as the actual
distribution. Hence, for ε = 1:
yEDE =
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
y1−εi
) 1
1−ε
(2)
Atkinson’s index of inequality, I, is the proportional difference between the arithmetic
mean, y¯, and yEDE, so that:
I =
y¯ − yEDE
y¯
(3)
and I reflects the ‘wastefulness of inequality’.
3 Alternative Ex-post Evaluations
Figures 1 and 2 show, for the period 1993—2005 and for two inequality aversion pa-
rameters, the time profiles of inequality and the equally distributed equivalent. The
period may be divided into two periods of equal length, 1994—99 and 2000—05.9 The
first period reflects a relatively stable degree of inequality while the second period
displays more variability, initially decreasing and then increasing steadily. Both the
general economic development and tax-payers’ behavioural reactions to tax legislative
changes have influenced the observed income patterns. The first part of the time pe-
riod coincides with a period of high economic growth (GDP growth above 4 per cent
in the period 1994—97), then growth rates are lower and more variable in the period
1998—2005 (but above 2 per cent in all years, except in 2003). However, from an income
distribution perspective, it is suggested that the development of the personal income
tax schedule is at least equally important. The tax reform of 1992 introduced a dual
8If ε = 1, y1−ε
i
/ (1− ε) is replaced by log y.
91993 is therefore not used in inequality comparisons, but as a base year when estimating ex-ante
incomes.
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income tax system, which combines a low proportional tax rate on capital income and
progressive tax rates on labour income.
These separate schedules for capital and labour income created obvious incentives
for taxpayers to take advantage of the lower tax on capital. For example, Thoresen
and Alstadsæter (2010) show that owners of small businesses were able to gain from
this schedule by changing organizational form. Overall, there was a notably increase
in (low taxed) dividend income transfers to households over the period, from less than
10 billion in 1994 to nearly NOK100 billion in 2005. Only 2001 does not fit into the
steady upward trend, as there was a temporary tax on dividends for shareholders that
year. Furthermore, corporations brought forward their distribution of profits because
of the pre-announced tax reform of 2006 (Alstadsæter and Fjærli, 2009), given that
it was evident that the reform introduced taxation of dividends at both the corporate
and individual level (in contrast to the 1992 reform, which had only corporate-level
taxation), through a shareholder income tax; see Sørensen (2005) for further details.
As dividend income is unequally dispersed — for example, 95 per cent of dividends were
received by individuals in decile 10 in 2004 — this has resulted in a substantial increase
in post-tax income inequality over the period (with an exception for 2001) and changes
in the composition of income across income distributions; for more details see Lambert
and Thoresen (2009, Figure 3).
A time subscript must now be added to each individuals’ income. For convenience,
the following ignores discounting. Consider first an ex-post evaluation over T periods
which uses as welfare metric for each individual the average annual income, y¯i =
1
T
∑T
t=1 yit. Hence the welfare function is not actually concerned with the way in which
any individual’s income is distributed over the time period, and thus may be said to
reflect a lack of concern for the nature of the mobility process. For the period 1994—
2005, the use of the average annual income as welfare metric for each individual gives
Atkinson inequality measures of 0.076, 0.134 and 0.210 respectively for values of ε of
0.5, 1.0 and 1.5. These each reflect value judgements which tolerate substantial leaks in
making equalising transfers.10 These values may be compared with the annual average
inequality measures of 0.099, 0.181 and 0.298 respectively. The use of a longer period
whereby individual incomes are averaged is thus equalising in this case.
10For example, if 1 unit is taken from A to make a transfer to B, where A is twice as rich as B, a
transfer of 0.5 units leaves social welfare unchanged if ε = 1. This falls to 0.25 units if ε = 2.
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Figure 1: Atkinson Inequality Measures, Annual Income 1993-2005, ε = 0.5 and ε = 1
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Figure 2: Equally Distributed Equivalent Annual Income: 1993-2005
7
Table 1: Atkinson Inequality Measures: Annual Average Income Inequality and In-
equality with Annual Average as Welfare Metric
Period 1994—1999 Period 2000—2005
ε = 0.5 ε = 1.0 ε = 1.5 ε = 0.5 ε = 1.0 ε = 1.5
Inequality: Annual average of single year values
I¯y 0.084 0.165 0.263 0.108 0.188 0.307
Using each individual’s annual average as welfare metric
Iy¯ 0.071 0.134 0.183 0.082 0.147 0.228
Further details for the two sub-periods are shown in Table 1.11 For the second
period, the absolute reduction in inequality when using annual average income as the
welfare metric compared with annual average inequality, is double the reduction ob-
tained for the first period. The inequality-reducing effects of using a longer accounting
period, mentioned above, therefore appears to be greater in a period when annual
inequality is generally increasing.12 However,the percentage reduction in inequality
is larger in the first period for ε = 1.5. This arises because the very high degree of
inequality aversion places more emphasis on the low end of the income distribution.
The income mobility which produces the increasing annual inequality is thus also
responsible for reducing the inequality of a multi-period income measure (each person’s
annual average) below average annual inequality. However, mobility may not necessar-
ily be seen as beneficial from an individual’s point of view. It may also be seen as an
undesirable source of economic instability. For example, individuals may for some rea-
son be unable to smooth consumption over time when facing income fluctuations and
they might be averse to such variability in income. Imperfections of capital markets or
other constraints may prevent individuals from smoothing consumption over time; see
Atkinson, Bourguignon and Morrison (1992).13
11Standard errors of the estimates, which can be obtained by bootstrapping procedures, are not
reported as they in general are very small due to the sample size (more than 2,600,000 observations).
12This of course differs from the comparative static argument discussed in the introduction, and
examined in detail by Creedy and Wilhelm (2002) in terms of inequality and social welfare.
13Shorrocks (1978a) argues that mobility is always desirable, whereas Chakravarty, Dutta and Wey-
mark (1985) establish a no-mobility hypothetical benchmark from which they can distinguish between
desirable and undesirable mobility. Like King (1983), they make use of the equally distributed equiva-
lent idea. The difficulties of establishing a reasonable social welfare understanding of income mobility
is discussed by Atkinson (1981), Dardanoni (1993) and Fields (2010).
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It may therefore be desired to allow, in the welfare metric, for an aversion to income
variability, as suggested by Creedy and Wilhelm (2002); see also Jarvis and Jenkins
(1998) on the disutility of income volatility. This can be done, in an ex-post context,
by using instead of y¯i a welfare metric, y˜i, defined as:
y˜i =
1
T
T∑
t=1
y1−γit
1− γ
(4)
The parameter γ measures the degree of aversion to variability of income over time, and
the same parameter is assumed to apply to all individuals. As ex-post values are used,
the aversion coefficient, γ, is not interpreted in terms of risk aversion: this is discussed
in Section 4 below. The relative values of ε and γ determine whether inequality aversion
(of the judge whose value judgements are represented by the welfare function) is high
enough to overcome the individuals’ aversion to income variability over time. When
aversion to income variability is high relative to inequality aversion, a more ‘static’
society is preferred, in which income is more stable at the ‘cost’ of higher inequality of
multi-period income.
Table 2: Atkinson Inequality Measures with Aversion to Income Fluctuations
Period 1994—1999 Period 2000—2005
ε = 0.5 ε = 1.0 ε = 1.5 ε = 0.5 ε = 1.0 ε = 1.5
γ = 0 0.071 0.134 0.217 0.082 0.147 0.289
γ = 0.5 0.085 0.148 0.236 0.098 0.161 0.311
γ = 2.0 0.130 0.206 0.349 0.144 0.217 0.375
γ = 3.0 0.151 0.235 0.427 0.166 0.244 0.499
Table 2 shows the extent to which the values in Table 1 are increased when aversion
to intertemporal fluctuations is introduced. In order to eliminate the effect of general
income growth over time, incomes were adjusted so that average annual income is
constant (and equal to the overall mean) in each period. Hence the inequality values in
the first row of Table 2 differ slightly from those in the final row of Table 1. It is clear
that inequality increases as individuals’ aversion to income variability increases. The
inequality differences between the first and second sub-periods are less influenced by
aversion to income variability over time. The differences for γ = 0 and positive γs are
approximately similar in the two subperiods. As the last period involves a temporary
tax on dividends for the shareholders in 2001, one may expect stronger effects from
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increases in the value of γ in that period, but no clear manifestation of such effects is
evident in Table 2.
4 An Ex-ante Perspective
The suggestion that relative income mobility is associated with uncertainty leads to the
idea that an alternative evaluation may be based on an ex-ante measure, rather than ex-
post incomes as in the previous section. For example, Shorrocks (1978b, p.1016) argues
that ‘interest in mobility is not only concerned with movement but also predictability’.
Furthermore, the uncertainty aspect of mobility is emphasised by contributions which
see mobility in terms of future opportunities, as in Bénabou and Ok (2001), or account
for origin independence, as in Gottschalk and Spolaore (2002). An ex-ante perspective
is introduced in subsection 4.1. The approach requires a model of income dynamics
and this is described in subsection 4.2. Results using the new metric are presented in
subsection 4.3
4.1 The Welfare Metric
The approach considered here is to replace the above welfare metric with one defined
in terms of expected incomes, conditional on income in a specified period, E (yit| yi0),
so that (4) is replaced by:
E (y˜i) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
E
(
y1−γit
∣∣ yi0)
1− γ
(5)
Here the parameter γ can be interpreted in terms of risk aversion. In a one-commodity
setting and with indifference with respect to the timing of risk, risk aversion is the
inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Thus resistance to intertemporal
substitution, or variability aversion, is closely related to risk aversion.
Application of this approach therefore requires knowledge of the conditional expec-
tation of future incomes. The following subsection proposes a measure of expected
income obtained by modelling the income process.
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4.2 Modelling Income Dynamics
The aim of this section is to present and estimate a simple model of individuals’ ex-
pectations of future incomes which can be used to produce ex ante income measures.
Consider a dynamic process containing both a stochastic component and a component
in which changes depend on the position of individuals relative to the geometric mean;
see also Creedy (1985) and Creedy and Wilhelm (2002). As before, yit denotes individ-
ual i’s income in period t, and let µt denote the mean of logarithms in period t, with
mt = exp (µt) as the geometric mean. The income process can be written as:
yit =
(
yit−1
mt−1
)β
exp (µt + vi + ηit) (6)
where the stochastic component consists of an individual-specific effect, vi, and a ran-
dom component, ηit, assumed to be independent of income, with zero mean and a
variance in each period of σ2η. Equation (6) can be rewritten as:
(log yit − µt) = β
(
log yit−1 − µt−1
)
+ vi + ηit (7)
The autoregressive parameter, β, captures variations in income which decline more
slowly over time. In other words it reflects movements in income that, while not per-
manent, tend to persist for several years. Suppose also that in this simple income
process, the autoregressive parameter and income variance is common for all individu-
als, and heterogeneity in the process is represented through the individual fixed effect
(individual fixed level relative to the mean) and the error term.
Table 3 reports results of using several estimators. These include the least squares
dummy variables (LSDV), and generalised method of moments (GMM) estimators
as in Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998). Because the lagged
dependent variable is correlated with the error term, it has been shown that the use of
LSDV result in biased estimates. Anderson and Hsiao (1981) suggested first eliminating
the fixed effect by taking first differences, and then using yt−2 as instrument for ∆yt.
However, this does not exploit all the relevant moment conditions so it is not the
efficient GMM estimator. Arrelano and Bond (1991) derived other moment conditions
to be used in GMM estimation. This estimator is known as the Arrelano-Bond GMM
estimator. Other instruments have been suggested by a succession of researchers, such
as the Arellano and Bover/Blundell and Bond system estimator (Arellano and Bover,
11
Table 3: Parameter Estimates for the Income Mobility Process
Method and Parameter All years 1994-1999 2000-2005
LSDV
β 0.452 0.279 0.227
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ση 0.276 0.280 0.282
AB-GMM
β 0.492 0.477 0.351
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
ση 0.415 0.308 0.316
GMMSYS
β 0.476 0.486 0.387
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ση 0.419 0.309 0.313
GMM-MA(1)
β 0.473 0.527 0.443
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
ση 0.524 0.406 0.436
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses below parameter estimates.
1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998), which uses moment conditions in which lagged first
differences of the dependent variable are instruments for the level equation. In practice,
it is difficult to find good instruments for the first-differenced lagged dependent variable,
which can itself create problems for the estimation. Kiviet (1995) shows that panel
data models using instrumental variable estimation often lead to poor finite sample
efficiency and bias. Also, tests show that none of the methods rejects the assumption
of no autocorrelation in first differenced errors. Thus, the final specification is a GMM
model assuming moving-average serial correlation in the residuals.14
Table 3 shows that a common result for all specifications is that the estimated value
of β is higher in the first sub-period than in the second sub-period, while the estimate
of σ2η is higher in the second sub-period. Since the standard errors are low, it may
be inferred that the estimated β’s in the two periods are also significantly different
from each other. The lower degree of regression towards the mean and lower variance
in the first period implies lower income mobility, and therefore higher predictability
14Lags three or higher are used as valid instruments for the differenced equation.
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of future incomes. Conversely, the parameter values imply higher mobility and less
predictability in the second sub-period. In the following subsection, reported results
are based on the Arrelano-Bond GMM estimator.
The model specified in (7) is simple compared with a number other approaches
used. A less parsimonious model, such as the error component model, which is now a
standard model in the income process literature15 would probably provide more reliable
estimates for the income process. Adding heterogeneity in the model parameters as
in Baker and Solon (2003) and Browning et al. (2010) would improve the model even
more.
However, the basic model used here has been chosen for two reasons. First, it is
helpful to keep the perspective of the social planner. An income process is specified that
the planner is assumed to use for prediction of future incomes, based on observations
of current incomes. All individual characteristics, observable or unobservable, that
may explain individual income levels are captured by the individual fixed effect. We
assume that the planner, possibly with the help of an econometrician, has estimated
the distribution of these fixed effects on historical data, and furthermore, assumes
that these are constant over time. Second, the simple autoregressive income process
is in line with the Markov-models often used in the income mobility index literature,
and therefore provides a link between the income mobility literature and the more
econometrically orientated income process literature.
Including other explanatory variables, such as age, family composition and edu-
cation would substantially complicate the prediction of future incomes. While age is
straightforward to predict, prediction of future family composition is rather demand-
ing. Education is challenging too, as the specification already accounts for a fixed
effect. Thus, fixed effects soak up much of the explanatory power of variables that
are either time-invariant or close to time-invariance. We have explored the effects of
using other explanatory variables, such as age, family composition and education. The
estimated autoregression coefficients became somewhat lower, but the overall result
did not change. This suggests that the main difference between income mobility in the
two periods is due to genuine income dynamics rather than, for instance, substantial
differences in family dynamics. Comparisons were also made using alternative income
15This literature is represented by the works of Lillard and Willis (1978), MaCurdy (1982), Abowd
and Card (1989), Baker (1997), Carroll and Samwick (1997), and Ramos (2003).
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definitions. Labour income yields similar estimates for the autoregression coefficient,
but exhibits a much larger variance. For gross income there is less regression towards
the mean (that is, higher β) than for the two other income definitions, and the differ-
ence between the two periods is larger. Also, as expected, the standard deviation of
gross income is higher than for income after tax.
4.3 Inequality Using the Ex-ante Welfare Metric
In order to obtain measures for the contribution of the estimated income process to
the overall ex-ante welfare evaluation, a closed-form expression for expected income as
a function of income in the initial period, E (yit|yi0), is required. It is shown in the
Appendix that:
E (yit|yi0, vi) = exp
{
µt + β
t (log yi0 − µ0) + vi
(
1− βt
1− β
)
+
1− β2t
2
(
1− β2
)σ2η
}
(8)
where estimates of individual fixed-effects, vi, are obtained using their sample counter-
parts. The corresponding equally distributed equivalent in terms of expected income,
EDEE(y|y0), can be expressed as:
EDEE(y|y0) =
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
E (yit|yi0)
1−γ
) 1−ε
1−γ
] 1
1−ε
(9)
from which, given the arithmetic mean, the Atkinson measure can be obtained in the
usual way. In this case it depends on the degree of regression towards the mean, the
income variance, the degree of aversion to inequality and the degree of aversion to
fluctuations in income. When β < 1, the initial (relative) position is given less weight
over time, while the role of the individual-specific position is increasing over time.
Expected income is also increasing over time.
The inequality measures for the ex-ante welfare metric are shown in Table 4, where
again any effects of income growth are eliminated by maintaining arithmetic mean
constant. These may be compared with Table 2. For the sub-period 1994—99, inequality
is lower for all values of ε examined and for the variability aversion coefficients of 0 and
0.5. For the very high values of γ of 2.0 and 3.0, inequality is higher when the ex-ante
measure is used, particularly for the high inequality aversion coefficient. The estimated
value of β is rather low while that of σ2η is high compared with values reported in earlier
14
Table 4: Atkinson Inequality Measures for Expected Income
Period 1994—1999 Period 2000—2005
ε = 0.5 ε = 1.0 ε = 1.5 ε = 0.5 ε = 1.0 ε = 1.5
γ = 0 0.004 0.068 0.135 0.109 0.165 0.218
γ = 0.5 0.037 0.095 0.165 0.150 0.208 0.246
γ = 2.0 0.132 0.221 0.417 0.250 0.367 0.492
γ = 3.0 0.166 0.394 0.513 0.290 0.481 0.603
studies; see Creedy (1985). The considerable variability implied by the high σ2η would
produce increasing annual inequality over time, without the low value of β, implying
considerable regression towards the mean. In the expression for E (yit|yi0), the effects
of terms involving powers of β rapidly become insignificant. Expected incomes are
dominated by the high σ2η which, for the high mobility-aversion cases, implies a higher
measured inequality. From (8), setting all terms involving βt and β2t to zero16 and
rearranging gives:
logE (yit)− µt =
vi
1− β
+
σ2η
2
(
1− β2
) (10)
Hence the variance of logarithms of expected income soon becomes σ2v/ (1− β)
2, where
σ2v is the variance of the fixed effect in the autoregressive income-generation equation.
Therefore for higher σ2v and lower β, as in the second sub-period considered, inequality
of expected values is quickly increasing towards a relatively high value.
In the ex-post case, there is less inequality than anticipated as a result of the re-
gression towards the mean. For the second sub-period, the role of unanticipated, but
systematically equalising, mobility is even greater and β is lower. Hence the ex-ante
welfare metric produces higher inequality, for nearly all combinations of variability
aversion and inequality aversion parameters, than for the ex-post metric. The ex-
ceptions are for the combination of low variability aversion with very high inequality
aversion. Also, the inequality differences between the two sub-periods are maintained
or increased when moving from the ex-post to the ex-ante perspective.
Discounting has been ignored here for ease of exposition. Introducing discounting
of time periods would imply that greater weight is placed on the first period. In other
words, the initial distribution would play a relatively larger role than without discount-
16This is the same as replacing E (yit|yi0) by E (yit), that is the unconditional expectation.
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ing. As long as time preference is homogeneous across individuals and constant over
time, introducing discounting would not change the qualitative difference between the
two sub-periods considered.17 But, as the initial distributions become more dominant
under discounting, the inequality estimates in Table 4 would be modestly increased.
It is therefore necessary to consider the role of the initial distributions. It may be
argued that it is difficult to interpret the results for the two periods in Table 4 in terms
of different income processes because they begin with different initial distributions.
For this reason two sensitivity analyses were carried out. First, it was assumed simply
that (log yi0 − µ0) = 0 for all individuals (so that the fixed effect is the only individual
variation). Second, the same initial distribution was used in both periods (hence, the
second period process was estimated using the initial 1993 distribution). Unreported
results show that the results are not sensitive to the choice of initial distributions. This
lack of sensitivity is likely to arise because of the high degree of regression towards the
mean.
5 Conclusions
The aim of this paper has been to consider the use of alternative welfare metrics in eval-
uations of income inequality when a multi-period income measure is used, and hence
relative income mobility plays a crucial role in influencing the relationship between
short- and long-period inequality. One basic approach, most commonly adopted in in-
come distribution studies, is to base measures on ex-post magnitudes. Using Norwegian
longitudinal income data, it was found, as in many studies, that income inequality is
lower when each individual’s annual average income is used as welfare metric, compared
with the use of a single-period accounting framework. However, the longer accounting
period can produce both lower and higher inequality than annual measures, depending
on the assumed degree of aversion to income fluctuations over time.
The second approach took as its starting point the argument that relative income
mobility introduces uncertainty about future incomes, so that it may be desired to
evaluate inequality using an ex-ante approach. To this end, a regression model of in-
come dynamics was used in order to generate individuals’ expected values of future
17However, if individuals were not indifferent to the timing of risk, then introducing discounting
would lead to a preference for early resolution of risk.
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income, conditional on actual income in a specified initial period. The use of expected
incomes was found generally to produce higher values of inequality over longer peri-
ods, although again comparisons depend on the assumption regarding the aversion to
income inequality of the social welfare function, and aversion to income fluctuations
on the part of individuals. The results were strongly influenced by the observed high
degree of systematic regression towards the (geometric) mean, combined with a large
extent of random proportional income changes. The distinction between expected and
unexpected mobility was thus found to be important.
In the choice of welfare metric there is of course no single ‘correct’ approach, and the
contribution of the economist is to investigate the implications of adopting alternative
value judgements. The present paper is therefore in this spirit of extending the range
of value judgements which can be examined.
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Appendix A: Expected Income
This appendix derives the expected value of an individual’s income, conditional on
income in an earlier period. Define zt, dropping individual subscripts, as:
zt = (log yt − µt) (A.1)
Inserting zt in equation (7) gives:
zt = βzt−1 + v + ηt (A.2)
Backwards induction yields:
zt = v + ηt + β
(
v + ηt−1
)
+ β2
(
v + ηt−2
)
+ ...+ βk−1
(
v + ηt−k+1
)
+ βtzt−k
= βtzt−k +
k−1∑
s=0
vβs + ξt (A.3)
where:
ξt = ηt + βηt−1 + β
2ηt−2 + ...+ β
k−1ηt−k+1 (A.4)
Using yt = exp (zt + µt) from (A.1):
yt = exp
{
µt + v
(
1− βk
1− β
)
+ ξt + β
t
(
log yt−k − µt−k
)}
(A.5)
The variance of log yt is thus equal to V ar (ξt), which, if η is normally distributed,
is from (A.4) given by a weighted sum of normal variables. This is also normally
distributed, with V ar (
∑
i aiXi) =
∑
i a
2
iV arXi. Hence the variance of log yt is:
V ar
(
k−1∑
s=0
vβs
)
= σ2η
k−1∑
s=0
β2s =
1− β2k
1− β2
σ2η (A.6)
In general, if the variable x is lognormally distributed with mean and variance of
logarithms of m and s2 respectively, then E (x) = exp
(
m+ s
2
2
)
. Taking expectations
of y, gives:
E (yt| yt−k) = exp
{
µt + β
k
(
log yt−k − µt−k
)
+ v
(
1− βk
1− β
)
+
1− β2k
2
(
1− β2
)σ2η
}
(A.7)
Setting k = t gives the result in (8) above.
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